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ABSTRACT
We use the theory of complex networks in order to quantitatively characterize the structure of reciprocal ex-
positions of Italian banks in the interbank money market market. We observe two main different strategies of
banks: small banks tend to be the lender of the system, while large banks are borrowers. We propose a model
to reproduce the main statistical features of this market. Moreover the network analysis allows us to investigate
properties of robustness of this system.
1. SOCIO-ECONOMIC NETWORKS
In the recent years we observe an increasing interest in complex networks theory. Looking at the recent literature,
we observe two parallel lines of research: on the one side many researcher from different scientific fields (Biology,
Computer Science, Physics) focus on a description of the complex structure of interactions in many complex
systems (ranging from Internet to the WWW, from the protein interaction to the food web) and on their scaling
properties;1 on the other side, Social Scientists and Economists focus on application of networks in order to
understand the role of heterogeneous interactions in the formation of aggregate behavior of systems composed by
many agents. In this paper we want to consider both lines of research and use the recently developed statistical
tools for complex networks in order to get some insights in the most crucial economics issues.
In particular we study the credit-debt relationships of banks in the Italian Interbank market focusing on the
amount, maturity and interest rate of reciprocal exposures. The investigation of this system is very important
not only to have a statistical description of the overall structure of relationships, but also to better understand
possible mechanisms of systemic risk in the Italian bank system.
2. A SURVEY OF THE MONEY MARKET
The interbank market emerges as a consequence of the need of banks to manage their liquidity. Liquidity
management in the banking system is essential for a smooth operate of payment systems, and in particular
real time gross settlement (RTGS) systems. For example, in the Euro area the European Central Bank (ECB)
normally aims to satisfy the liquidity needs of the banking system via its open market operations (main and
long-term re-financing operations, fine-tuning and structural interventions) the most relevant of which are the
weekly auctions. Auctions were executed at a fix term rate until June 2000 and since then are conducted with
variable rate. The ECB decides in advance the minimum bid rate and the fixed amount of liquidity to be
supplied through the auction. On Mondays afternoon credit institutions present their bids to the respective
national central banks (NCB). Banks submit the amount of money they want to deal and interest rate they are
ready to pay for it. The ECB collects bids on Tuesdays morning and executes the auctions. The allocations
are settled on the bank’s account to the NCB on Wednesdays. The Euro-system also offers credit institutions
two standing facilities: the marginal lending facility in order to obtain overnight liquidity from the central bank,
against the presentation of sufficient eligible assets; and the deposit facility in order to make overnight deposits
with the central bank.
Credit institutions in the Euro area are required to hold minimum reserve balances with NCBs (set at 2% of
all deposits and debts issued with a maturity of less than two years, excluding repos and interbank liabilities, but
with a minimum threshold applied). Reserves provide a buffer against unexpected liquidity shocks, mitigating
the related fluctuations of market rates. They have to be fulfilled only on average over a one-month maintenance
period that runs from the 24th of a month to the 23rd of the following month (when this is not a holiday in
which case is anticipated to the previous working day).
3. THE SPECIAL CASE OF ITALIAN MONEY MARKET
The interbank markets are basically managed by each European country.4 These markets are in almost all case
phone-based, that means that each bank has some brokers doing their transactions by phone. The only exception
is the Italian market, which is totally screen-based, implying that each banks operator can see real time quotes
of all other banks and do its transaction.
The recent paper by Boss et al5 investigate the network of overall credit relationships in the Austrian Interbank
market. In their study the authors analyze all the liabilities for ten quarterly single months periods, between
2000 and 2003, among 900 banks. They find a power-law distribution of contract sizes, and a power-law decay
of the distribution of incoming and outgoing links (a link between two banks exists if the banks have an overall
exposure with each other). Furthermore they show that the most vulnerable vertices are those with the highest
centrality (measured by the number of paths that go through them).
A different issue has been explored by Cocco et al.6 who have investigated the nature of lending relationships
in the fragmented Portuguese interbank market over the period 1997-2001. In fragmented markets the amount
and the interest rate on each loan are agreed on a one-to-one basis between borrowing and lending institutions.
Other banks do not have access to the same terms, and no public information regarding the loan is available.
The authors showed that frequent and repeated interactions between the same banks appear with a probability
higher than those expected for random matching. In addition they found that during illiquid periods, and in
particular during the Russian financial crisis preferential lending relationships increased.
Our paper focuses on the network analysis of the overnight maturity on the e-MID interbank market.? This
market is unique in the Euro area in being screen based and fully electronic: outside Italy interbank trades
are largely bilateral or undertaken via voice brokers. While banks can still choose with whom to trade, the
information about the rates and the trades are public.
The Italian electronic broker market MID (Market for Interbank Deposits)∗ covers the entire existing domestic
overnight deposit market in Italy. Both Italian banks and foreign banks can exchange funds on the e-MID. The
participating banks was 215 in 1999, 196 in 2000, 183 in 2001 and 177 in 2002. Rates can be expressed in
basis points or 1/16ths for the Euro and in basis points or 1/32nds for the US Dollar. The minimum quote
is 1.5 million Euros and 5 Million US dollars. Each quote is identified as an offer or a bid. An offer indicates
that the transaction has been concluded at the selling price of the quoting bank while a bid indicates that a
transaction has been concluded at the buying price of the quoting bank. The names of the banks are visible next
to their quotes to facilitate credit line checking. Quotes can be submitted and a transaction is finalized if the
ordering bank accepts a listed bid/offer. When a bid rate is hit, the transaction can be executed automatically
or manually within 90 seconds, if a bank prefers to first check the lending counterpart name. Whilst in the case
of a hit on an offer rate, this always needs to be accepted manually within 90 seconds, to allow for credit line
checking. The market also permits bilateral trades with a specific counterpart of choice†.
4. DATA SET
Our data set is composed by banks operating on the Italian market for which we have the complete record of
all transactions. The data set used to construct the interbank network includes only overnight transactions and
consists of encoded name of first bank, encoded name of second bank, amount of transaction, rate applied to
transactions, rate. To de-codify the name of banks, a list of banks has been provided: the first number is the
label of the bank, the second one is the group of classification of that bank provided by Italian National Bank
∗e-MID is run by e-MID S.p.A. Società Interbancaria per l’Automazione (SIA), Milan. The central system is located
in the office of the SIA and the peripherals on the premises of the member participants.
†For more details see http://www.e-mid.it/index.php/article/articleview/85/0/29/.
(1= foreign banks, 2= big Italian banks, 3= medium Italian banks, 4= small Italian banks, 5= cooperative credit
banks).
For every day of trading, we compute the network of debts/loans.
Our data set consists of all the overnight transactions concluded on the e-MID from January 1999 to December
2002 for a total of 586,007 transactions. For each contract we have information about the date and time of the
trade, the quantity, the interest rate and the name of the quoting and ordering bank. The information about
the parties involved in a transaction allows us to perform an accurate daily analysis of the connectivity among
banks and its change over time.
5. NETWORK ANALYSIS
Given our dataset, we can define three daily matrices: the adjacency matrix A, the connectivity matrix C and
the weighted connectivity matrix W .
The element of the adjacency matrix aij indicate if a transaction between bank i and bank j has occurred
during a given day, i.e. aij = 0 if no transaction has occurred and aij = 1 if at least one transaction has occurred.
The elements of the connectivity matrix cij denote the number of transactions between bank i and bank j
in a given day.
The elements of the weighted connectivity matrix wij denote the overall volume exchanged between bank i
and bank j in a given day. The number of active links in the network is defined as Nl =
∑
ij aij/2, the number
of transactions as NT =
∑
ij cij/2 and the overall trading volume as V =
∑
ij wij/2. We denote the number of
active banks as Nb.
The three matrices, A, C, W , define non-directed graphs in the sense that the links are bi-directional with
aij = aji, cij = cji and wij = wji. Our dataset also allow us to construct matrices associated to directed graphs.
We can make links directional by allowing them to follow the flow of money, so that a link is incoming to the
buyer and outgoing from the seller. A directed graph may be more relevant if one was interested in assessing
the risk of contagion‡ and systemic default in the system. Hence we define six more matrices Ab, Al, Cb, Cl and
W b, W l. The elements abij (a
l
ij) indicate if at least one transaction has occurred on a given day between bank
i and bank j with bank i as the borrowing (lending) bank. The elements of the connectivity matrix cbij (c
l
ij)
denote the number of transactions on a given day between bank i and bank j with bank i as the borrowing
(lending) bank. The elements of the weighted connectivity matrix wbij (w
l
ij) denote the overall volume exchanged
on a given day between bank i and bank j with bank i as the borrowing (lending) bank. Obviously wlij = w
b
ji.




ij . The flow is positive if the bank is a net lender. With
this convention we define a weighted graph, whose plot is in figure 1
Highly interconnected systems have been the focus of a great body of research in Computer Science, Physics
and the Social Sciences. As stated in the Chapter 1, recently the focus has shifted to weighted networks. A
set of metrics combining weighted and topological observable have been proposed to characterize the statistical
properties of the strength of edges and vertices and to investigate the correlations among weighted quantities
and the underlying topological structure. We remember the commonly used metrics with some more general
definitions:
• Degree















‡a shortage of liquidity can propagate from a bank to the ones that have a relation of credit to it
Figure 1. A plot of the inter bank network. The color codes for the various groups are the following: 1=yellow, 2=red,
3=blue, 4=black. Note that the black vertices (bank of group 4) form the core of the system.
• Strength
Another measure of the network properties in terms of the actual weight of each link (i.e. the size of the
trade on that link, or the number of times the link has been used) is obtained by looking at the vertex












































Hence, the clustering coefficient allows to calculate the proportions of nearest neighbors of a node that are
linked to each others (in our contest, if there exist a link between two banks who have a common trading







expresses the statistical level of cohesiveness measuring the global density of interconnected vertex triplets
in the network.
• Diameter
In a graph the distance between two vertices is given by the length of the shortest path joining them (if
it exists). In a connected graph the average distance is the average over all distances. If the graph is not
connected, the average distance is defined as the average among all distances for pairs both belonging to
the same connected component. The diameter of a graph is given by the maximum of all distances between
pairs.
• Participation ratio
For a given node i with connectivity ki and strength si the weights of the edges can either be of the same
order of magnitude si/ki, or can be heterogeneously distributed, with some edges dominating others. The
participation ratio is defined as

















If all weights are of the same order then Y2 ∼ 1/ki while if a small number of weights dominate Y2 is close
to 1. A value of the participation ratio close to one would then indicates preferential relationships among
banks§.
Similarly we can define the participation rates Y w,b2 (i) and Y
w,l)
2 (i) separating incoming and outgoing links.















The distribution of banks’ degree and strength indicates that banks have an highly heterogeneous behavior,
since the number of their partners varies very widely. In Fig. 2 the distribution of degree for a particular day
is plotted: we observe high skewness, proving that some banks have many partners, but most of the banks have
few partners. Moreover in same figure the assortativity and clustering distributions show a peculiar architecture
of the network. The system shows disassortative mixing, i.e. banks with higher degree are more likely connected






















Figure 2. Cumulative distribution of banks degree (left); distribution of clustering coefficient c and assortativity knn(k)
versus k.
We note that the degree and the volume are correlated,9 since v(k) = k1.1 (see Fig.5) and therefore is
statistically significant to consider the degree and the volume as different informations.
§Note that the statistics used by Cocco et al. (2003) is the lender preference index (LPI) (and the corresponding













































Figure 6. Participation ratio Yc(k)
In figure 3 and 4 we show that the banking system is highly heterogeneous with both the daily cumulative
distribution of banks’ weights (volume of single contract) and strengths (trading volumes) fat tailed. Banks with
more partners transact bigger amounts of liquidity. The total volume transacted by each bank is not equally
distributed of its links as we observe from the plot of the participation ratio Y c2 (i) (Fig.6): real participation
ratio (dots) differ from a random case of equally distributed weights (straight line); banks with an high number
of connections have heterogeneous volumes of contracts with their partners.
Interestingly, regardless the change in volumes all the above topological measurements remain similar when
computed in different days of month.
7. EMERGENCE OF DIFFERENT BEHAVIORS IN THE INTERBANK MARKET
Detecting common behaviors of communities of vertices would help in providing insights to understand the of
hidden organization principles. We try to understand if there are some banks with similar behavior and if they
have some properties in common.2 We are able to identify specific features for banks of different size. In fact
for each bank we know its category (small, medium, large, very large) based on the capital of the banks (as
recorded by Bank of Italy). We observe that this classification is strongly correlated with the total amount of
daily volume of transactions. Using the latter quantity we can divide banks in four groups (same number of
classes of the Bank of Italy classification). Group 1 with volume in the range 0− 23 million Euro per day, Group
2 in the range 23 − 70 million Euro per day, Group 3 in the range 70 − 165 million Euro per day, Group 4 over
165 million Euro per day. In this way we find an overlap of more than 90% between the two classifications.
Using this information we realized the picture 1 of the system as an oriented network whose size and color
of the vertices represent the different groups that play the role of communities when described by means of
a network. We used the Kamada-Kaway algorithm: this algorithm makes more connected nodes to be nearer
to each other. As evident from Figure 1 we find that the core of the structure is composed by banks of the
last groups (very large). The edges in Figure 1 represent the net amount of money exchanged in a whole day.
As mentioned above, the measurements in different days give similar results. A more quantitative measure of
the different behavior of banks from different groups is given in the Table 8, where for every pair of groups we
reported the mean percentage of the total number of transactions between banks of those groups. This result
is confirmed by the first two plots of Figure 7, where we represented in-degree frequency distribution (number
of borrowing edges) and the out-degree frequency distribution (number of lending edges) in the network. It is
possible to compute the group of the banks whose degree is k. We represented this information by coloring
accordingly the plot.
With respect to the scale of colors in Figure 1, we also added some intermediate colors to account for the
values between one group and another. The tail of the two distributions is black, i.e. it is mainly composed by
banks of group 4. We again find that banks of groups 1 and 2 are the leaves of the network, staying at periphery
of the structure and not interacting each other. This particularity together with the experimental evidence that
they are more lenders on average means that banks of this group are the lenders for the whole system (in fact
the 70% of the total volume transacted pass through lenders).
8. A MODEL TO REPRODUCE THE TOPOLOGICAL FEATURES
In order to reproduce the topological properties we define a model whose only assumption is that a vertex is
solely determined by its size (as measured by its capital or equivalently by its group).2 Therefore, the idea is
that the vertices representing the banks are defined by means of an intrinsic character corresponding to the size
of the bank.10, 11 Since this information is not available we use the total daily volume of transactions as a good
measure of the size of banks (we stated above that this is a good approximation).
Following the Pareto’s law (confirmed in this data analysis) we assume that the distribution of sizes v in the
model is a power-law P (v) ∝ v−2, where the value of the exponent correspond to that of the data, as we see in
Fig. 4.
Figure 7. Top left and top right: a plot of the in-degree and out-degree distributions respectively. As already noticed, the
contribution to the tail of frequency distribution emerges from the banks of group 4. Using the division in 4 groups, i.e.
in 4 colors, mentioned in the text, we also colored each bin of F (k) with the average color of vertices which are in that
bin. For example the average color of banks with degree 10 is blue. For non integer value of this average we introduced
intermediate colors. Bottom left: frequency distribution F (k) for a certain degree k. Comparison between experiment
(red dots) and results obtained with simulation of our model (black dots). Bottom right: comparison between experiment
(red dots) and results obtained with simulation of our model (black dots) for the assortativity 〈knn(k)〉 and in the inset
for the clustering coefficient c(k) .
We assign to the N nodes (N is the size of the system) a value drawn from the previous distribution. Vertices
origin and destination for one edge are chosen with a probability pij proportional to the sum of respective sizes




















We obtain in this way pij =
vi+vj
2(N−1)Vtot
This choice of probability reproduces the fact that big banks are privileged
in transactions among themselves while two little banks are very unlikely to interact. We produce an ensemble of
100 equiprobable statistical realizations of the model and then we calculate average statistical distributions. In
Fig. 7 we compare experimental and simulated P (k), c(k) and knn(k): here the distributions are also averaged
on all EOM days of 2002. The simulation of the model reproduces remarkably well the considered topological
properties of the inter-bank market P (k), c(k) and knn(k). To quantify the agreement between experimental
and simulated networks we also define an overlap parameter m specifying how good is the behavior of the model
in reproducing the observed clustering.
To quantify the agreement between experimental and simulated networks, we proceed in the following way.
We define a matrix E, that is a weighted matrix 4 × 4, where the weights represent the number of connections
between groups. In order to measure the overlap between the matrices obtained by data and by computer model,















g,k , is equal to Etot in both cases. Therefore the maximum
possible difference is 2Etot. This happens when all the links are between two groups in one case and in other
two groups in the other. We use this maximum value to normalize the above expression and we than define the
overlap parameter m: m = 1 − d/2Etot
A natural way to define groups in the model is to obtain a similar number c of banks for each class i.e.
c = Nbanks/Nclasses. It is useful nevertheless to pass to continuous form. Using the previously introduced
P (v) giving the probability distribution of the size v of one bank. Banks of the same group g are in the range
[vg, vg + △vg] so that by taking a continuous distribution for v we get
∫ vg+△vg
vg
P (v′)dv′ = c (15)
where P (v′) is defined above. In our case, since the average number of banks is 140, we get c = 35. Then
△v = cv2/(N − cv) We now compute the number Eg,k of links going from one group of banks gg to another one




ai,jδ(gg − g(i))δ(gk − g(j)) (16)
where g(i) represent the group of bank i. In the continuous approximation, defining Ev′v′′ the number of edges










P (v′)P (v′′)p(v′, v′′)dv′dv′′ (17)
Group 1 2 3 4
1 0 6 4 8
2 6 3 8 17
3 4 8 5 27
4 8 17 27 22
Table 1. The number of daily interactions between the banks of different groups. Data have been averaged during one
month.
where N is the number of vertices, p(v′, v′′) is the linking probability, P (v) is the fitness distribution and the
formula is obtained integrating the expression for the average degree11 (the integration domains are the ranges
of volumes of groups g and k respectively). To evaluate the relevance of division in classes, we have to compare
the value of Eg,k with the corresponding quantity E
null
g,k for a network where there is not a division in classes
(null hypothesis). The analytical expression for the null case is Enullg,k = Etot/10 where 10 is the number of
possible couplings between the 4 groups. The comparison between the two networks evidences that in the real
case emerges the division in groups: in Tab. 1 for each possible combination of groups is reported the value
Eg,k/Etot. In the null case, each element of the same matrix should be equal to 10. In our case the overlap m is
very good (98%).
The role of the different groups is shown in the Figure 8.
Figure 8. The division on classes of vertices allows to represent in a very easy way the organizational principles of the
network. Following results of Table 1 we draw a link among two groups when the number of links between banks belonging
to them is bigger then the average value (10). Using the net volumes as weight of links, we can represent the directed
interactions among classes of nodes: class 4 appear to be clearly a borrower and class 1 lender.
9. EFFICIENCY AND STABILITY OF THE INTERBANK NETWORK
The main objectives of economical scientific research on interbank liquidity markets are to assess the efficiency of
the interbank market and second to understand potential implications of the current institutional arrangements
on the stability of the banking system.
About the first topic, namely efficiency, the market is efficient if each bank can provide the liquidity it
needs in short time. We show that preferential lending in our system is limited and in fact banks interact with
banks randomly chosen and cash flows directly from the lender to the borrower without intermediaries. These
observations suggest that the interbank market is relatively efficient.
The stability of an economic system is very important field of research. Financial crises, i.e. the incapacity
to finance businesses and industries have recently hit several countries all around the world. These events have
triggered a boom of papers on banking-crises, financial risk analysis and numerous policy initiatives to find and
understand the weak points of the financial system. One of the major concerns in these debates is the so called
systemic risk: the large scale breakdown of financial intermediation due to domino effects of insolvency. This
phenomenon is favored by the small world property: in this network the maximum topological distance between
any two banks is 3 . From figure 9 we can see that almost all nodes are far away from any other by at most
three links.

















Figure 9. cumulative distribution of distances among all pairs of nodes: we observe that the maximum distance between
any pair of nodes is L = 3
The network of mutual credit relations between financial institutions is supposed to play the key role in the
risk of propagation of failures. The mutual credit network can be represented by the liability or exposure
The flow of payments is uniquely determined by the structure of the liability matrix. We are interested in
the stability of financial system with respect to external shocks, in particular which banks are likely to default
due to shocks and which banks will drag other banks into default due to their mutual credit relations.? These
two different behaviors are related to the betweenness property of the node, that is the fraction of shortest paths





where gjk is the number of shortest paths connecting nodes j and k and gjik is the number of shortest paths
connecting nodes j and k passing trough i.
The betweenness is a measure of flow of money passing trough the node.
Figure 10 discloses that nodes with high number of partners have also more flux of money trough them.
This proves from the topological point of view that there is not a hierarchical structure in the network, but a
configuration with highly connected nodes in the core, as we observed above. In fact big banks, which have
more partners, manage also the most of liquidity of the market: we can understand that these banks may play
a crucial role in the case of bankruptcy chains. Further will focus on the dynamics of these failure cascading.
10. CONCLUSIONS AND IMPLICATIONS ON ITALIAN INTERBANK MARKET










Figure 10. average betweenness b for nodes with degree k
We explored the network of interconnections among banks in the Italian overnight market and, by applying
several metrics derived by computer science and physics, uncovered a number of microstructure characteristics.
The banking network is fairly random, preferential lending is limited and cash flows directly from the lender
to the borrower without intermediaries. Banks also do not seem able to exploit short term profit opportunities
by borrowing from some and lending to others on the same day. All these observations suggest that the interbank
market is relatively efficient.3
The banking system is highly heterogeneous and is arranged in a configuration with large banks borrowing
from a large number of small creditors. Iori et al.? showed, in artificial market models, that when banks are
heterogeneous a high connectivity increases the risk of contagion and systemic failure. The current institutional
settings push banks towards a even more connected configuration as the EoM date approaches, and doing it may
increase the potentials for systemic risk. A policy implication of this work could be to encourage the design of a
mechanism for reserve requirements that does not require banks to simultaneously fulfill their average reserve.
Finally we presented here a network representation of the interbank market that in a natural way allows to
detect the presence of communities of banks: we observe that big banks are very interacting each other, while
small banks always interact with the bigger ones.2 Furthermore big banks act as borrower of the system and
small banks as lenders. By means of a suitable chosen model of network formation we can also understand the
mechanism driving the formation of such communities. The agreement between the model and experimental
results is remarkably good; this seems to suggest that the network formation is not due to the growth mechanism
of preferential attachment.
Since the effects of European Central Bank policies are under debate,7 graph theory can help in understanding
the system behavior under change of external conditions.
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